Shopping Center Parking Lot Liability by Sylvester, Beverly E.
Cleveland State University
EngagedScholarship@CSU
Cleveland State Law Review Law Journals
1965
Shopping Center Parking Lot Liability
Beverly E. Sylvester
Follow this and additional works at: https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev
Part of the Torts Commons
How does access to this work benefit you? Let us know!
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at EngagedScholarship@CSU. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Cleveland State Law Review by an authorized editor of EngagedScholarship@CSU. For more information, please contact library.es@csuohio.edu.
Recommended Citation
Beverly E. Sylvester, Shopping Center Parking Lot Liability, 14 Clev.-Marshall L. Rev. 570 (1965)
Shopping Center Parking Lot Liability
Beverly E. Sylvester*
M ORE THAN sixty-eight million automobiles were registered
in the United States in 1963 alone.' This horde of auto-
mobiles, along with the mass exodus to the suburbs, has caused
shopping centers to become integral parts of community living,
and has made facilities for parking around them of principal im-
portance. The resultant revolution in merchandising has extend-
ed the property owner's duty of care to include such parking
areas.
Occupant's Duty to Use Care
An occupant of land who lawfully induces others to enter
upon his property through express or implied invitation owes to
them a duty to keep the parking area in a reasonably safe con-
dition for its contemplated use and to give warning of any latent
defects or concealed dangers of which he has knowledge. 2 A
leading English case, Indermaur v. Dames, laid down the rule
that the occupier of land is under an affirmative duty to protect
those who enter upon his land for business purposes not only
against those perils of which he knows, but also against those
which he might discover with reasonable inspection.3 These de-
fects include snares, traps, pitfalls, and similar hazardous con-
cealed conditions which the shopper does not know about and
which he would not easily observe by the exercise of ordinary
care.4 The land holder is obligated to discover any such defec-
* B.A., Lake Erie College; M.A., Western Reserve Univ.; Fourth-year stu-
dent at Cleveland-Marshall Law School of Baldwin-Wallace College;
Teacher at St. Jude's School, Warrensville Hts., Ohio.
1 Automobile Facts and Figures 19 (Published by Automobile Manufac-
turer's Association 1964).
2 Rodgers v. The Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 148 Conn. 104, 167 A. 2d
712 (1961); Fitz Simons v. National Tea Co., 173 N. E. 2d 534 (Ill. App.
1961); Leonardo v. The Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 164 N. E. 2d 900
(Mass. 1960); Nary v. Parking Authority, Town of Dover, 156 A. 8d 42
(N. J. Super. 1959); Goldman v. Kossove, 253 N. C. 370, 117 S. E. 2d 35(1960).
a L.R. 1 C.P. 274, 35 L.I.C.P. 184, af'd L.R. 2 C.P. 311, 36 L.J.C.P. 181
(1866).
4 Tulsa Stockyards v. Mangrum, 380 P. 2d 534 (Okla. 1963); Bostian v. Jew-
ell, 121 N.W. 2d 141 (Iowa 1963).
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five circumstances by reasonable inspection5 and must warn of
such dangers.6
In an action for injuries sustained by a seventy-three year
old woman who fell over a retaining wall in a shopping center's
parking area, the proprietor's duty to warn the public of unusual
topography was limited to those imperfections which are not
known or discoverable by the average intelligent person in his
exercise of reasonable care.7 This duty was extended to include
the approaches of the store used in connection with the businesss
as well as the interior.9 Therefore, where a store proprietor pro-
vides a parking area for the public in conjunction with his busi-
ness he is held to know the risks that exist on his premises and
must caution his patrons or provide measures to prevent injuries
to them'0 by exercising ordinary care in keeping such premises
and approaches in a reasonably safe condition."
Sections 4101.01 and 4101.11 (1953) of Page's Ohio Revised
Code Annotated, state that the owner or occupant must maintain
the premises where his business is conducted "and the premises
appurtenant thereto," in a reasonably safe condition "to protect
the life, health, safety and welfare of frequenters" of such prem-
ises.
The criterion used to measure this conduct is the degree of
ordinary care12 which would be exercised by the reasonably pru-
dent man under similar' s or identical circumstance. 14 The area
to which the public is invited is assumed to be safe and the pa-
trons are not expected to search for hidden dangers.' 5 A com-
5 Handleman v. Cox, 187 A. 2d 708 (N. J. 1963).
6 Behrendt v. Ahlstrand, 118 N.W. 2d 27 (Minn. 1962).
7 Underhill v. Shactman, 337 Mass. 730, 151 N.E. 2d 287 (1958).
8 Shields v. Food Fair Stores, Inc., 106 So. 2d 90 (Fla. App. 1958). E.g.,
sidewalks, Smith v. United Properties, Inc., 2 Ohio St. 2d 310 (1965).
9 Seng v. American Stores Co., 384 Pa. 338, 121 A. 2d 123 (1956).
10 Handleman v. Cox, supra n. 5; Slobodzian v. Beighley, 164 A. 2d 923 (Pa.
1960).
11 Horvill v. Swift & Co., 117 S.E. 2d 202 (Ga. App. 1960); Perez v. Ow, 19
Cal. Rptr. 372 (Cal. App. 1962).
12 Raper v. McCrory-McLellan Corp., 130 S.E. 2d 281 (N. C. 1963).
's Peters v. The Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 72 So. 2d 562 (La. App.
1954).
14 S. S. Kresge Company v. Holland, 158 F. 2d 495 (6th Cir. 1946).
15 Hook v. Point Montara Fire Protection District, 28 Cal. Rptr. 560 (Cal.
App. 1963).
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plaint alleging injuries sustained by a minor who fell off of his
motor bicycle at a defective entranceway connecting a street to a
parking area was sufficient to state a cause of action.10 Negligence
in such situations is the omitting of an act which a man of ordi-
nary prudence would do by way of exercising reasonable care in
managing his property. 17 Yet the possessor of land used in general
commerce is not the insurer of its users' safety, and is under no
duty to reconstruct this land to obviate normal, ordinary and
obvious risks encountered by the users.' 8 Neither is he obligated
to construct barriers for automobile bumpers along the parking
lot for the protection of customers on the sidewalks in front of
the stores. 19
However, a proprietor could reasonably anticipate a frantic
crowd of customers when, in holding an anniversary sale on his
parking lot, paper plates were dropped from an airplane and
which were redeemable for merchandise by store managers.2 °
Patrons in a shopping center parking area provided by a store
are considered "invitees" of the property holder.
21
Actual or Constructive Notice
No presumption of fault arises on the part of the occupier of
property merely because a customer is injured. 22 Therefore, the
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is held inapplicable to slip and fall
cases.23 Defects in the premises must be shown to have existed
for such a period of time as to have given the storekeeper actual
16 Shields v. Food Fair Stores, Inc., supra n. 8.
17 Saeter v. Harley Davidson Motor Co., 8 Cal. Rptr. 747 (Cal. App. 1960).
18 Capobianco v. Yacovilli Restaurant, Inc., 360 S.W. 2d 302 (Mo. App.
1962); Brown v. Alabama Food, Inc., 190 A. 2d 275 (D.C. Cir. 1963); Raper
v. McCrory-McLellan Corp., supra n. 12.
19 Beaney v. Carlson, 174 Ohio 409, 189 N.E. 2d 880 (1963).
20 Hicks v. M. H. A. Inc., 129 S.E. 2d 817 (Ga. App. 1963).
21 Ibid; Kelley v. Goldberg, 288 Mass. 78, 192 N.E. 513 (1938); Gray v. Wat-
son, 189 S.E. 616 (Ga. App. 1936); Bremer v. Smith, 191 A. 395 (Pa. Super.
1937).
22 Sattler v. The Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 18 F.R.D. 271 (D.C.
1955).
23 Ibid; Raper v. McCrory-McLellan Corp., supra n. 12; Hallett v. Furr's
Inc., 378 P. 2d 613 (N. M. 1963); Hays v. Maison Blanche Co., 30 So. 2d 225
(La. App. 1947); Bremer v. Smith, supra n. 21.
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or constructive notice of them,24 or there must be a showing of
carelessness in the general practices of the proprietor.25
Defendants were held not liable for plaintiff's injuries in the
absence of any proof showing how long melting ice cream 26 and,
in another case, a slippery substance27 had been on parking spots
whereas holes28 in parking lots have been held to be constructive
notice.
A defendant who runs a sewer line through his shopping
center parking lot and fills it with dirt up to the level of the sur-
rounding concrete has notice from the very nature of this work
of the hazardous condition created for patrons driving across
such an area the day after a rainfall. 29
The absence of any evidence showing how long an icy con-
dition existed on a parking lot prevented a showing of liability
of a defendant.30 The law of Ohio 3' and that of other states
32
does not impose a duty upon a store owner to remove the natural
accumulation of snow and ice, provided the area is otherwise
maintained in a non-hazardous condition."3 While the storm is
24 Norwood v. Belk-Hudson Company of Valdosta, 129 S.E. 2d 810 (Ga.
App. 1963): Brophy v. Clisaris, 368 S.W. 2d 553 (Mo. App. 1963); Haefeli v.
Woodrich Engineering Co., 255 N. Y. 442, 175 N.E. 123 (1931); Wild v. Atlan-
tic Refining Co., 195 F. 2d 151 (3rd Cir. 1952); Bremer v. Smith, surra n. 21;
Norris v. Belk's Dept. Store of Dunn, N. C., Inc., 130 S.E. 2d 537 (N. C.
1963).
25 Peters v. The Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., supra n. 13; Greeves v.
S. H. Kress & Co., 198 So. 171 (La. App. 1940).
26 Perez v. Ow, supra n. 11.
27 Doherty v. Providence Journal Co., 181 A. 2d 105 (R. I. 1962).
28 Seigel v. Detroit City Ice & Fuel Co., 324 Mich. 205, 36 N.W. 2d 719
(1949); Willis v. Rivermines I. G. A. Supermarket, 350 S.W. 2d 437 (Mo.
App. 1961).
29 Nydegger-Friedman Realty Corporation v. Sweeney, 271 F. 2d 954 (4th
Cir. 1959).
30 Hall v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 360 S.W. 2d 536 (Tex. App. 1962); Daley v.
Sears, Roebuck & Co., 182 F. 2d 347 (6th Cir. 1950); Rodofsky v. Stop &
Shop, Inc., 164 N.E. 2d 158 (Mass. 1959).
31 Martinelli v. Jerry Cua Market, 184 N.E. 2d 514 (Ohio App. 1962); Stra-
ley v. Keltner, 164 N.E. 2d 186 (Ohio App. 1959); Levine v. Hart Motors,
143 N.E. 2d 602 (Ohio App. 1955); Turoff v. Richman, 61 N.E. 2d 486 (Ohio
App. 1944).
32 Brent v. Bank of Aurora, 132 Colo. 577, 291 P. 2d 391 (1955); Bersch v.
Holton Street State Bank, 247 Wis. 261, 19 N.W. 2d 175 (1945); Crawford v.
Soennichsen, 175 Neb. 87, 120 N.W. 2d 578 (1963).
33 Wise v. The Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 115 N.E. 2d 33 (Ohio App.
1953).
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still in progress the storekeeper has no duty and the invitee must
protect himself.
34
A contrary view was held in Evans v. Sears, Roebuck and
Company where a judgment for the plaintiff was sustained de-
spite the fact that the storm had ceased only an hour prior to the
plaintiff's fall. Evidence indicated that ice had been on the lot
for a whole day before the snow storm, thereby allowing suffi-
cient time for its removal by the defendant.35
There is a duty to remove a hazardous artificial accumula-
tion of snow and ice, 6 and liability will result from an unreason-
able failure to remove it.3 7 Where defendant's snow plow piled
the snow at the end of his parking lot and alternate days of dif-
ferent temperature ranges caused some of the snow to melt and
then accumulate into a rough rutted frozen surface, a duty arose
to correct this defective condition." When a business visitor can
plainly see and easily avoid the danger created by the weather
conditions he may be precluded from damages.3 9 It will be for
the jury to decide the carelessness of the customer or the negli-
gence of the store operator.40
Proximate Cause
A nine year old child in the parking lot of defendant's store
was struck by a vehicle traveling in the wrong lane of traffic.
Although the store operator was negligent in not replacing the
worn-off marking lanes, the independent act of the motorist was
the proximate cause of the injury.41 In an action to recover for
injuries received by a minor who alighted from his uncle's car to
play on a merry-go-round provided on a supermarket's parking
lot and was struck by the automobile of a third person, the plain-
tiff still had to establish the relationship between his injury and
34 Hallett v. Furr's Inc., supra n. 23.
35 104 S.W. 2d 1035 (Mo. App. 1937).
36 Zide v. Jewel Tea Co., 188 N.E. 2d 383 (Ill. App. 1963).
37 Merkel v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 187 A. 2d 52 (N. J. Super. 1962).
8 Fitz Simons v. National Tea Co., supra n. 2.
39 Morris v. The Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 384 Pa. 464, 121 A. 2d 135
(1956); Crawford v. Soennichsen, supra n. 32; Crenshaw v. Firestone Tire &
Rubber Co., 380 P. 2d 828 (N. M. 1963).
40 The Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. Chapman, 72 F. 2d 112 (6th Cir.
1934); King Soopers, Inc. v. Mitchell, 140 Colo. 119, 342 P. 2d 1006 (1959).
41 Booth v. Warehouse Market, Inc., 286 P. 2d 721 (Okla. 1955).
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the defendant's breach of duty. The Supreme Court held that
the defendant's motion for a directed verdict should have been
granted since the absence of a protective enclosure around the
merry-go-round did not directly contribute to the accident.4 2
In Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Musfelt the retailer maintained his
parking spaces adjacent to the sidewalk so that customers had to
drive across the walk to use the parking facilities. Plaintiff was
struck by an unknown careless driver backing across the abut-
ting sidewalk. For the resulting injuries she sued Safeway. Al-
though the defendant had a responsibility with respect to pedes-
trians using the walk he could not provide against the negligent
acts of an unknown third person.43
Statutory Standards of Care
An ordinance or statute may impose a higher standard of
care.4 4 Neglect of the statutory duty must be the proximate
cause of an injury to constitute a cause of action.45
In Peterson v. Safeway Stores, Inc. the negligence of the
plaintiff was to be considered by the jury, even though defend-
ant failed to roughen the surface of a ramp leading from the
parking lot to the store entrance as required by a city ordi-
nance.4 6 In Burroughs v. Ben's Auto Park the issues of negli-
gence and proximate cause were for the jury. In this case the
plaintiff fell over a twelve foot unguarded wall-the top of which
was level with the driving surface of the parking lot. An order
of the Commander of the Western Defense established regula-
tions for dimming lights. However, the light intensity where the
plaintiff fell was less than that which the regulation allowed. 47
In a similar case, although no ordinance was involved, a
store operator switched off his lights to indicate he was closing
for the evening as the plaintiff left the premises. Plaintiff stepped
over a retaining wall and fell down a descending ramp. This
area was not part of the parking section provided by the store
42 Jackson v. Pike, 87 So. 2d 410 (Fla. 1956).
43 349 P. 2d 756 (Okla. 1960).
44 Widell v. Holy Trinity Catholic Church, 121 N.W. 2d 249 (Wis. 1963).
45 Sisk v. Ball, 371 P. 2d 594 (Ariz. 1962); Kendrick v. Atchison T. & S. F.
Ry. Co., 320 P. 2d 1061 (1963).
46 7 Cal. Rptr. 924 (Cal. App. 1960).
47 27 Cal. 2d 449, 164 P. 2d 897 (1945).
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proprietor and belonged to another, but that fact was considered
unimportant.48 An inadequately lighted lot may constitute a dan-
gerous condition for those invited upon the property if it causes
customers to trip over wooden curbing, 49 concrete coping be-
tween parking lanes,50 or unknown objects.51 Customers must
not be unreasonably exposed to danger5 2 caused by insufficient
illumination. 53
In a Texas case the court held that a store, by announcing
its grand opening, does not warrant that the parking area is fully
completed and in safe condition. A hazardous partial gravel sur-
face-the cement surfacing incomplete-is as apparent to the
person injured as to the land owner.54 There is no liability where
the danger is known equally to the invitee and the owner. 55
In a completed area it is not negligent to maintain changes
in elevation which are obvious to the public and should be ex-
pected.5 6 Should plaintiff obstruct his own view by large pack-
ages or bundles, certainly he is not absolved from exercising rea-
sonable care and observation.5
7
A greater duty of care and observation is placed upon a
handicapped person such as one who is semi-blind 58 or whose
48 The Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. Pedersen, 247 F. 2d 4 (1st Cir.
1957).
49 McFarland v. Sears, Roebuck and Co., 91 S.W. 2d 615 (Mo. App. 1936).
50 Downing v. Drybrough, 249 S.W. 2d 711 (Ky. App. 1952).
51 Nelson v. The Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 137 A. 2d 599 (N. J.
Super. 1958).
52 Crampton v. Kroger Co., 162 N.E. 2d 553 (Ohio App. 1959); Campbell v.
Hughes Provision Co., 153 Ohio 9, 90 N.E. 2d 694 (1950); J. C. Penney Co.
Inc. v. Robison, 128 Ohio 626, 193 N.E. 401 (1934); S. S. Kresge Co. v. Fader,
116 Ohio 718, 158 N.E. 174 (1927).
53 Reed v. Ingham, 125 So. 2d 301 (Fla. App. 1960); Dean v. Safeway
Stores, Inc., 300 S.W. 2d 431 (Mo. 1957); Cathcart v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.,
183 A. 113 (Pa. Super. 1936).
54 Casteberry v. Levine's Inc., 351 S.W. 2d 114 (Tex. App. 1961).
55 Hoffman v. The Kroger Co., 340 S.W. 2d 152 (Mo. App. 1960); Barrow v.
James, 130 S.E. 2d 352 (Ga. App. 1963).
56 Watkins v. Piggley Wiggley Bird Co., 31 F. 2d 889 (8th Cir. 1929); Boyle
v. Preketes, 260 Mich. 629, 247 N.W. 763 (1933); Albachten v. Golden Rule,
135 Minn. 381, 160 N.W. 1012 (1917); Dickson v. Emporium Mercantile Co.,
193 Minn. 629, 259 N.W. 375 (1935); Haddon v. Snellenburg, 293 Pa. 333, 143
A. 8 (1928); Main v. Lehman, 294 Mo. 579, 243 S.W. 91 (1922); Seal v. Safe-
way Stores, 48 N. M. 200, 147 P. 2d 359 (1944); Smith v. United Properties,
Inc., 2 Ohio St. 2d 310 (1965) (sidewalk).
57 Coleman v. Colonial Stores, Inc., 130 S.E. 2d 338 (N. C. 1963); Safeway
Stores, Inc. v. McCoy, 376 P. 2d 285 (Okla. 1962).
58 DiMenna v. City of Philadelphia, 381 Pa. 596, 114 A. 2d 123 (1955).
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sight is in any way defective. 59 Such a person who voluntarily
subjects himself to danger,0° does so at his own risk.61
Oily spots on a parking lot frequented by a business visitor
almost every day for a number of years were held to be known
to the customer who slipped on such spot.6 2 The customer as-
sumed the consequences by having knowledge of such conditions
and may be barred from recovery.63 Such conduct falls below
the standard to which the plaintiff must conform.
64
Parking Lot as Nuisance
Despite the conveniences provided by a collective group of
business enterprisers, the use of an adjoining parking lot in con-
junction with such businesses has been held a public nuisance if
it is immediately adjacent to a residential area. Noise, fumes,
dust and blocked traffic reduce the value of the neighboring
property. There is a duty not to infringe upon the rights of a
neighbor.6 5
Contrary views have been held that parking lots are not a
nuisance per se even though located in a residential neighbor-




It is well established that a landlord is liable for injuries
sustained by a third person because of the landlord's negligence
in connection with any portions of the premises that he controls.
67
59 Riddell v. The Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 192 Tenn. 304, 241 S.W.
2d 406 (1951).
60 Goade v. Benevolent & Protective Order of Elks, Pomona, Cal., Lodge
No. 798, 28 Cal. Rptr. 669 (Cal. App. 1963).
61 Mills v. Springfield, 142 N.E. 2d 859 (Ohio App. 1956).
62 Plotner v. The Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 59 Ohio App. 367, 18
N.E. 2d 409 (1938).
63 Benton v. United Bank Building Co., 223 N. C. 809, 28 S.E. 2d 491 (1944);
Bolen v. Strange, 192 S. C. 284, 6 S.E. 2d 466 (1939).
64 Henderson v. Kansas Power & Light Co., 380 P. 2d 443 (Kan. 1963).
65 Rhodes v. A. Moll Grocery Co., 95 S.W. 2d 837 (Mo. App. 1936); City &
County of San Francisco v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 310 P. 2d 68 (Cal. App.
1957).
66 Hannum v. Oak Lane Shopping, 383 Pa. 618, 119 A. 2d 213 (1956); Essick
v. Shillam, 347 Pa. 373, 32 A. 2d 416 (1943).
67 32 Am. Jur. Landlord And Tenant, § 768 (1941); Schallinger v. The
Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 334 Mass. 386, 135 N.E. 2d 655 (1956); Har-
rison v. Struich, 19 Ohio L. Abs. 374 (Ohio App. 1935).
8https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol14/iss3/14
14 CLEV-MAR. L. R. (3)
If he leases out a part of the premises while retaining control
over another part, he will be subject to liability upon the other
part.
68
A landlord would not be liable for injuries sustained by an
invitee upon the rented premises not under his control.69 An ac-
tion was properly dismissed against the lessors of a supermarket
where evidence proved that the lessees had exclusive possession
of the premises in the area where plaintiff was injured.70 The
lessee owed the duty to keep the premises in a reasonably safe
condition for invitees. But should the lessor extend an invitation
to the public for his own purposes his liability is not absolved.
7 1
The same is true of a tenant who exercises control outside of the
portion of the premises leased by him. 7 2
When premises are leased for the admission of the public the
lessor is under an affirmative duty to inspect and repair the
premises before transferring possession. Otherwise he may be
liable to a third party for a dangerous condition existing on the
land at the time of the transfer.73 Some courts have said that the
lessor has invited the public to enter and his responsibility to
the public is so great he can not shift it to the tenants.74 There
are opinions to the contrary.7
5
Fraud or deceit notwithstanding the doctrine of caveat emp-
tor applies to the lessee, for with the lease he acquires control of
the property. This control forms the basis of his duty to use
ordinary care as to the condition of the premises.76 If the lessor
was aware of latent defects in the property which were con-
cealed from the lessee this would be sufficient to charge the land
68 Siegel v. Detroit City Ice & Fuel Co., supra n. 28; Murphy v. Illinois
State Trust Co., 375 Ill. 310, 31 N.E. 2d 305 (1941); Durkin v. Lewitz et al.,
123 N.E. 2d 151 (Ill. App. 1954).
69 Shepard v. Worcester County Institution for Saving, 304 Mass. 220, 23
N.E. 2d 119 (1939); Harrison v. Struich, supra n. 67; Schallinger v. The
Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 334 Mass. 386, 135 N.E. 2d 655 (1956).
70 Cole v. McGhie, 361 P. 2d 938 (Wash. 1961).
71 McCarthy v. Isenberg Bros. Inc., 321 Mass. 170, 72 N.E. 2d 422 (1947).
72 Johnston v. De La Guerra Properties, Inc., 28 Cal. 2d 394, 170 P. 2d 5
(1946).
73 Burroughs v. Ben's Auto Park, supra n. 47.
74 Tulsa Entertainment Co. v. Greenlees, 85 Okla. 113, 205 P. 179 (1922);
Junkermann v. Tilyou Realty Co., 213 N. Y. 404, 108 N.E. 190 (1915).
75 Davis v. Schmitt Bros., 199 App. Div. 683, 192 N. Y. S. 15 (1922); Karlow-
ski v. Kissock, 275 Mass. 180, 175 N.E. 500 (1913).
76 Young v. Beattie, 172 Okla. 250, 45 P. 2d 470 (1935).
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owner with liability for injuries received as a result of such de-
fects. 77 There would be no duty to disclose conditions known to
the tenant 8 or conditions so obvious he might reasonably be ex-
pected to discover them.79
Conclusion
It is well recognized that the party actually controlling the
premises has conventional liability. His duty to keep the prem-
ises in a reasonably safe condition has been extended to the park-
ing areas of shopping centers.
A customer also has a duty to exercise reasonable care. Such
person may be precluded from damages when abnormal condi-
ditions on the parking lot are obviously present.
Points open to question are those involving latent and patent
defects upon the property and the duties of the lessor prior to
execution of the lease.
77 Colorado Mortgage and Inv. Co. v. Giacomini, 55 Colo. 540, 136 P. 1039
(1913); Anderson v. Robinson, 182 Ala. 615, 62 So. 512 (1913).
78 Manes v. Hines & McNair Hotels, 184 Tenn. 210, 197 S.W. 2d 889 (1946).
79 Shegda v. Hartford-Connecticut Trust Co., 131 Conn. 186, 38 A. 2d 668
(1944).
10https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol14/iss3/14
